ABSTRACTS

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Introduction. The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being and its Aristotelian Roots
This introduction outlines some of the fundamental stages in the debate on the doctrine of the analogy of being. This classic topic has attracted a renewed attention in recent years. In particular, several scholars have become convinced that the reason why the doctrine of the analogy of being was attributed to Aristotle lies in his definition of paronymous terms in his Categories. While it has mostly been established that no doctrine of the analogy of being exists in Aristotle’s work, there remains the question of why this doctrine was attributed to him, and what reasons were used to support this claim despite important findings to the contrary, based on Aristotle’s own texts, emerging from the 15th century onwards.

Keywords: Aristotle, Analogy, Being, Homonymy, Focal meaning

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Τὸ ὄν ἦι ὄντα? Notes on Metaph. Γ 1
Taking into account all available direct and indirect sources, we propose to return, in Metaph. Γ 1, 1003a29-31, to the text transmitted by the oldest manuscripts of the Metaphysics, paraphrased by Alexander, and edited by Bekker
(1831): τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ ὄντος [...] ἦν ὄντα. This reading has been unduly corrected by Bonitz, von Christ, Ross, and Jaeger into τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ ὄντος [...] ἦν ὄν. The modern exegesis of Γ 1, whether based on this faulty conjecture or not, has tended to miss the subtle gap Aristotle's authentic wording builds between the search for the elements in pre-Platonic natural philosophy and his own science of being qua being, which he conceives of as a search for first causes and principles, not as a search for elements.

Keywords: Aristotelian science, Presocratics, Elements, Ontology

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The Several Senses of Homonymy: the Origins of the Doctrine of the Analogy of Being
This contribution aims to demonstrate that we can still find new food for thought on the classic topic of the pseudo-Aristotelian doctrine of the analogy of being if we return to analyzing the issue of this doctrine’s origin. While it has been mostly established that Aristotle’s writings contain no explicit mention of any theory of the analogy of being, the question that remains is whether there are elements in Aristotle that enabled the development of such a doctrine. The present paper suggests that this is the case, and names the ancient commentators Alexander of Aphrodisias and John Philoponus as the initiators of that line of thinking that, based on Aristotle’s texts, attributed the analogy of being to the Stagirite. The main element leading to the full formulation of the doctrine in the Middle Ages is identified in the changeable meaning that Aristotle assigned to homonymy, giving rise to the conviction that homonymy itself could be interpreted in various ways.

Keywords: Aristotle, Homonymy, Analogy, Being, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Philoponus

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Is Substance a πρὸς ἕν Notion?
The question of whether substance is homonymous or synonymous is rarely raised as such in the vast literature on Aristotle’s theory of substance.
The present paper aims at filling this gap by tracing Aristotle’s thoughts about how substance is said. It is argued that substance is (problematically) synonymous in the *Categories*, while homonymy is the right framework for understanding the hylomorphic model of substance that Aristotle presents in the *Physics*, the *De anima* and the *Metaphysics*. The paper also discusses at some length whether the variety of homonymy that applies to substance on the hylomorphic model should be seen as an instance of πρὸς ἕν homonymy. The conclusion is that Aristotle considers this option, without endorsing it in a sufficiently consistent way or providing the details of how it should work in the case of hylomorphism.

*Keywords*: Aristotle, Substance, πρὸς ἕν, Homonymy, Hylomorphism

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*Mapping Oneness onto Being: The Contribution of Metaphysics Iota 1-2 to First Philosophy*

In *Metaphysics* Iota 1-2 Aristotle offers an elaborate discussion of the senses and the uses of ‘one’. Does his analysis fit into the programme of a science of being *qua* being outlined in *Metaphysics* Γ 2? Against the scepticism voiced by some recent interpreters, this paper argues that Iota contributes to the focal analysis of oneness promised in Γ 2. The discussion of the numerical one in Iota 1 emphasizes a crucial aspect of the one whereby it is always and necessarily restricted to the kind of thing that is to be counted or measured. This aspect connects quantitative oneness to the study of metaphysical oneness, so that an analysis of the latter can lay the foundation of our understanding of the former, as one would expect of first philosophy. Aristotle achieves this result through his distinction of the two essences of ‘one’, one essence close to the name (first measure), the other close to the thing (indivisibility). This distinction enables him to account for the different applications of the term ‘one’ (Iota 1) and proves crucial to undercutting the possibility of the Platonic account of the one as itself the *ousia* of everything (Iota 2). The paper argues that this is fully integral to the project of Γ 2 connecting the focal or primary sense of ‘one’ to the focal sense of ‘being’ as substance. One alleged reason for scepticism is that in Iota 1 Aristotle asserts that the essence of the one is most of all (μάλιστα) being the first measure, and especially in the strictest sense (κυριώτατα) of ‘measure’, and it is agreed that this one is the arithmetical one. These superlatives misleadingly suggest that arithmetical unity must be the most important topic of the chapter and spark doubts...
about the metaphysical relevance of Aristotle’s analysis. Through a discussion of parallel cases in *Metaph.* Θ 1 and 10, the paper shows that sometimes the strictest sense of a term is not the most relevant to Aristotle’s purpose, and concludes that this is the case in *Iota* 1.

*Keywords*: Being, First philosophy, Indivisibility, Measure, Number, One, Quantity

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*Analogy in Alexander of Aphrodisias*

The author examines the interpretation by Alexander of Aphrodisias of an argument in *Metaphysics* Δ 6 where Aristotle speaks of things that are one ‘by analogy’ (*κατ’ ἀναλογίαν*). He argues that Alexander’s commentary on that passage allows us to conclude that he understands analogy quite broadly so as to include not only four-term proportional relationships but also the two relationships spoken of in *Metaph.* Γ 2: the πρὸς ἕν (‘in relation to one’) relationship, expounded earlier in that chapter, and the τῷ ἐφεξῆς (‘numerical succession’) relationship, mentioned later (1004 a 9, 1005 a 11). The author then examines how Alexander, in his commentary on *Metaph.* Γ 2, ultimately distinguishes the πρὸς ἕν relationship from the τῷ ἐφεξῆς relationship. The essay concludes with two arguments aimed at resolving problems related to Alexander’s reading of *Metaph.* Δ 6 and Γ 2. One of the problems concerns the opening lines of *Metaph.* Α; the other concerns the final remarks in *Metaph.* α 1.

*Keywords*: Numerical succession [τῷ ἐφεξῆς], Towards one thing [πρὸς ἕν], From one thing [ἀφ’ ἑνός], As other in relation to other [ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο], Self-identity, Platonists, Being *qua* being, Subject of metaphysics, Synonymy, Homonymy

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*Being and Sense in Stoicism*

This paper aims to validate a doctrine’s possible coherence regarding categories of being within the logical-ontological theory of ancient stoicism. In Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*, we find the so-called stoic ‘theory of the four categories’ – substance, quality, disposition and
relative disposition (In Arist. Cat. 66, 32) – which has further evidence in Plotinus (Enn. vi, 1, 25, 1-3). I will suggest the hypothesis of a radical ‘univocity’ in stoic thought operating at two levels: at the level of the being as a corporeal entity (τὸ ὄν κατὰ σωμάτων μόνων λέγεσθαι, Alex. In. Arist. Top., 301, 22-23) and at the level of the ‘sense’ of reality (composed of bodies and incorporeal events) as expressed in language. According to the Stoics, language does not express ‘bodies’, that is, being entities, but rather ‘events’, that is, the effect of the intermingling of bodies. No discontinuity exists between propositions and events. As stated by G. Deleuze, «l’univocité de l’Être signifie que l’Être est Voix» (Logique du sens, 210). This way, I will try to articulate the possible reasons for the supposed disappearance of analogy from the perspective of stoic philosophy.

Keywords: Stoicism, Bodies, Incorporeals, Events, Categories, Univocity

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Boethius as Commentator and Interpreter of Aristotle’s Categories
Boethius’s commentary on the Categories played a decisive role in the reception and interpretation of Aristotle’s logic in the Latin West. In this paper, I propose a general overview of the initial section of the commentary (PL 64, 159A-168 D), with special reference to Boethius’s discussion on the topic of homonymy. The main purpose of my analysis is to show that, following Porphyry, Boethius: 1) transmits a general classification of homonymy, within which the notion of “analogy” will progressively assume an autonomous and intermediate status between pure homonymy and synonymy; 2) defines on the logical level the relationship between aequivocatio and translatio, which in the following centuries will assume a central importance in relation to the metaphysical question of the praedicatio in divinis.

Keywords: Homonymy, Metaphor, Categories, Analogy

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Notes on the Arabic Tradition of Metaphysics Iota 2
This paper devoted to the Arabic reception of Metaphysics Iota 2 tries to show how the investigation on the one proposed by Aristotle is under-
stood by the Arab commentators – even if in very different readings – such as the properly metaphysical inquiry on the first principle. After an introduction to Aristotle’s text, the Arabic tradition of Metaphysics Iota 2 is presented through the Arabic translation of Usṭā, a translator of al-Kindī’s circle (IX cent.). This translation has been preserved in Averroes’ Great Commentary on the Metaphysics, survived in the unicum manuscript Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Or. 2074 (cod. Arab. 1692). In his commentary, Averroës preserves some passages of a second Arabic version of Metaphysics Iota, commonly attributed to the Nestorian Ishāq ibn Hunayn. Finally, we find a paraphrase of Iota 2 in the Book on the Science of Metaphysics (Kitāb fi ʿilm mā bād al-ʿabīdā) by Abd al-Laṭīf al-Bağdādī (1162-1231).

Keywords: Aristotle, Metaphysics, One, Averroes, Abd al-Laṭīf al-Bağdādī

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The Role of “Analogy Entis” in Thomas Aquinas’ De Veritate: Pedagogical and Didactic Reflections

In Thomas Aquinas we do not find a systematic treatise on analogy, but the topic is often developed indirectly, for this reason it is the subject of in-depth discussions, with authoritative attempts to offer a systematic approach, starting from Caietano’s treatise (1498). In this text we propose an interpretative path that captures the role of the analogy in a pedagogical and didactic perspective: the teacher needs to use all the potential of the language, to mediate the knowledge and allow the students to learn. The analogia entis, especially in the way it assumes in the De veritate, becomes an effective tool for dealing with the most difficult issues, such as the knowledge we can have about God. Moreover, the path of teaching must lead the student to perform, under the guidance of the teacher, those steps that – even if he had done them alone – would have allowed him to learn. This is why it is important for the master to exploit the full potential of the “analogy entis” so that the beauty and depth of reality can be regenerated in the minds of the students.

Keywords: Analogy, Teaching, Pedagogy, Didactics
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The Role of Homonymy in the Description of the Relation Between Creature and Creator in Arabic Christian Theology

The contribution aims at verifying the use of philosophical notions in writings belonging to Christian Arabic theology (around 9th-13th century), in order to highlight their continuity with the late ancient tradition of philosophical studies. The chosen case study is the relation between God and created beings: in fact, it can be shown that in these writings this relation is described in terms reminiscent of the Aristotelian concept of homonymy, although mediated by the late ancient Greek commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories. In some instances, these descriptions also show similarities to some Arabic philosophical descriptions of the relation between God and created beings.

Keywords: Christian Arabic Theology, Homonymy, Relation Creature-Creator, Late Ancient Commentaries on Categories

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The Muqābasa 82 by Abū Ḥayyān Al-Tawhīdī

The present paper aims to analyse a lesson, held by the Muslim philosopher Abū Sulaymān al-Sīgistānī (d. 985), about the equivocal term ‘one’ and its definitions as conveyed by the man of letters Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawhīdī (d. 1023) in his muqābasa 82. In particular, it aims to stress the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic roots of al-Sīgistānī’s doctrines and the links they intertwined with the almost contemporary philosophical debates. The muqābasa is organised in two different sections. In the first part, al-Sīgistānī identifies eight different senses of the ‘one’, all linked to the works written by Aristotle or by his late-antique commentators. The second section, instead, concerns which sense is the most suitable to the First Being. By reading it, it is possible to identify in nuce some of the most important doctrines of Arabic Neoplatonism to which al-Sīgistānī seems to adhere to: the three super-sensible principles (i.e. One, Intellect and Soul); the different degrees of participation to causality by the single entities; man as microcosm and his spiritual ascent to the intelligible reality.

Keywords: Tawhīdī, Sīgistānī, One, Arabic Neoplatonism, Arabic Philosophy
Against and Within Univocity: The Transformations of Analogy between Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus

After a long, centuries-old incubation, starting with the late antique commentators on Aristotle, the doctrine of the analogy of being finally takes shape, in the second half of the 13th century, through Thomas Aquinas and especially Henry of Ghent. For one as for the other, the analogical relationship between substance and accidents does not coincide with the one between Divine being and created being. However, Aquinas seems to change his opinion on how to understand these two relationships several times, adopting different models of analogy in different places in his works. Henry proposes a more systematic and unitary framework, in which the analogy between substance and accident is based on the fact that the former acts as a subject for the latter, while the analogy between God and created beings is based on the fact that the former is the formal cause (in the order of esse essentiae) and efficient cause (in the order of esse existentiae) of the latter. When our intellect conceives a being, it always conceives, in a mutually exclusive way, either the Divine being or the created being. Any univocal concept of being is therefore an error, which depends on the inability to distinguish what is negatively indeterminate (Divine being) from what is privatively indeterminate (created being). The weakest point of Henry’s construction is his claim that we can attain to know God only by isolating the perfections that we know from creatures. The option in favour of univocity appears to John Duns Scotus as the only strategy to avoid this drawback: since, in the current state, we can only know through phantasms or sensible images, without a univocal concept of being we could never reach either the knowledge of substance (because our phantasms only refer to accidents) or the knowledge of God (because our phantasms only refer to finite being). This in no way implies a renunciation of analogy, to which Scotus remains faithful throughout his teaching, despite the passage from the logical equivocity of being (supported in his commentaries on Aristotle) to the logical univocity of being (developed in his commentaries on the Sentences). For Scotus as well as for some of his early followers, such as Petrus Thomae and John the Canon, analogy and univocity are not two opposing and alternative regimes, but two perfectly compatible approaches, as attested, in the 17th century, by Martin Meurisse’s Laurus metaphysica.

Keywords: Analogy, Univocity, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, Petrus Thomae, John Canon (Francis Marbres), Martin Meurisse
The Analogy between Divine Being and Creatural Being in Eckhart’s Commentary on Ecclesiasticus

This paper examines §§ 52-53 of Eckhart’s second lecture on the Ecclesiasticus, i.e. the locus classicus of Eckhart’s treatment of analogy, together with the well-known § 54 of his Commentary on Exodus and his other main explicit texts on the subject. The analysis carried out in the paper focuses on the implications of the example used by the Dominican Master to illustrate the concept of analogues, namely that of health and more specifically of the “health” of urine, compared to the way in which the circulus outside the tavern means wine. Through the comparison with Thomas Aquinas, the paper aims to highlight how, in the Commentary on the Ecclesiasticus, the creatural being is analoged to the divine being, not vice versa. The paper suggests to seek the theoretical justification for this position in the warnings of the general prologue of the Opus tripartitum and in the premises contained in the prologue of the Opus propositionum. If only God is a being in the proper sense, as it is stated there, then it is necessary that in the “vertical” analogia entis the analogatum princeps is God himself, not the creature.

Keywords: Eckhart, Analogy, Thomas Aquinas